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Friedman: Establishing Information Privacy Violations: The New York Experie

ESTABLISHING INFORMATION PRIVACY
VIOLATIONS: THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE
Lawrence Friedman*

Threats to information privacy-that is, to the control individuals
have over access to, and the dissemination of, information about
themselves and their activities'-may appear in many forms.
Commentators have focused recently, for example, on the threats to
information privacy posed by the war on terrorism and, in particular, its
invocation to sanction broad new governmental authority to intercept
and review otherwise private communications,' and to support the
creation of a national identification system.3 And much has been said
about the demand for personal information in the commercial market,

* Climenko/Thayer Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; Adjunct Professor of Law,
Boston College Law School. This Article benefited from the comments and suggestions of David
Gleason, Michael Meltsner, Carlos Perez-Albuerne and Shaun Spencer; a thorough and thoughtful
review by Elizabeth Howe; and the excellent research support and contributions of Emily Allen.
They should not be held responsible for any errors that remain.
1. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining information privacy as
"the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others"); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Out of
Context: The Purposes of Privacy, 68 Soc. RES. 209, 215 (2001) (describing "privacy" as "the
ability to exercise control over personal information"); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in
Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (1998) (describing information privacy as
concerned with "an individual's control over the processing-i.e., the acquisition, disclosure, and
use-of personal information"). Information privacy is but one aspect of a larger understanding of
privacy; in constitutional matters, for example, courts often distinguish information privacy from an
individual's "privacy" interest "in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (footnotes omitted); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 713 (1976) (noting recognition of a decisional privacy interest in "matters relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education").
2. See Shaun Spencer, Security Versus Privacy: Refraning the Debate, 79 DENV. U. L. REV.
519, 520, 572-73 (2002) (discussing threats to privacy in the name of security).
3. See Robert Kuttner, Privacy and National ID Cards, THE BOSTON GLOBE, May 1, 2002,
at A19 (discussing threat to privacy posed by national identification system); see also Walter Kim,
The Mother of Reinvention, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 2002, at 28 (discussing American
resistance to national identification system).
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and the privacy violations that may result from the availability and sale
of such information.
In this Article, I address another, more subtle threat to information
privacy: the failure of courts to recognize certain privacy violations as
causing an actionable injury. I examine this threat by discussing the
decision of the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division in Smith v.
Chase Manhattan Bank.6 In Smith, the court upheld the dismissal, for a
failure to allege actual harm, of a suit under New York's consumer
protection law in which the plaintiffs argued that a bank's deceptive
practices violated their interest in information privacy.7 Because many
state consumer protection statutes require a plaintiff to allege actual
harm in order to proceed to trial, the New York court's decision in Smith
establishes a precedent that may reach beyond the state's borders to
affect the judicial construction of consumer protection laws in other
jurisdictions and, indeed, the construction of other statutes that concern
information privacy.
Part I reviews the factual and legal issues raised in Smith. Part II
sketches the baseline understandings of information privacy that animate
my analysis of the Smith decision and its implications. In Part III, I
critique Smith from both doctrinal and normative perspectives to draw
out how the court's opinion threatens information privacy by
undermining potential claims for its violation. Part IV discusses the
implications of Smith in like cases arising under other states' consumer
protection laws, as well as its potential effect on assessments of
information privacy violations outside of the consumer protection
context. In conclusion, I suggest that privacy advocates in future cases
must be careful to provide for courts both a doctrinal basis for allowing
4.

See Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of

PersonalInformation, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1072-73 & n.202 (1999) (discussing individuals'
participation in consumer transactions without knowledge that merchants are acquiring their
personal information or transactional data); see also Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
Privacyand the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1398-1400 (2000) (noting that consumer
data can be used for many purposes with which consumers probably would not agree, including
employment and health insurance decisions). See generally ERIK LARSON, THE NAKED CONSUMER:
How OUR PRIVATE LIVES BECOME PUBLIC COMMODITIES (1992) (discussing consumer marketing
driven by the need for personal information).
5. I am concerned here with private sector conduct that serves to undermine information
privacy, specifically the use of personal identifying information by commercial entities in ways that
may violate consumer protection laws or other laws providing some protection for information
privacy. While that same information may be acquired by governmental actors in ways that amount
to privacy violations under constitutional or statutory norms, such conduct is beyond the scope of
this inquiry.
6. 741 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
7. See id. at 102.
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lawsuits alleging privacy invasion through deceptive practices to
proceed under consumer protection laws, and a supportable normative
rationale for recognizing as actionable the harm such invasions cause.
I.

SMITH V. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK

The plaintiffs in Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank held credit cards
and mortgages issued by Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. ("Chase").
They claimed that Chase violated a pledge to protect "privacy and
confidentiality and not to share customer information with any unrelated
third party," except in conjunction with its business, or to the extent
necessary to inform customers about "special offers of products and
services. ' Chase advertised this commitment in a document titled
"Customer Information Principles," which it distributed to the plaintiffs.9
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, unbeknownst to them,
Chase, "without their consent and without giving the plaintiffs an
opportunity to opt-out ... sold information to non-affiliated third-party
vendors, including the plaintiffs' names, addresses, telephone numbers,
account or loan numbers, credit card usage, and other financial data."'
"The third-party vendors used this information [to create] lists of Chase
customers, including the plaintiffs," that Chase "provided to
telemarketing and direct mail representatives to conduct solicitations.""
The third-party vendors agreed to pay Chase a commission if an
individual purchased a product or service offered. 2
The plaintiffs brought suit against Chase and its parent, Chase
Manhattan Corporation. Among other statutory claims,'3 the plaintiffs
alleged that Chase violated New York's General Business Law,' 4 by

8. Id. at 101.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. The plaintiffs alleged violations of New York's Civil Rights Laws prohibiting the
commercial misappropriation of a living person's name, portrait, or picture. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1988). The Smith court upheld the dismissal of these claims on the
ground that the Civil Rights Laws, "which must be narrowly construed, were never intended to
address the wrongs complained of." Smith, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 103. There is ample support for this
conclusion in the caselaw. See, e.g., D'Andrea v. Rafla-Demetrious, 972 F. Supp. 154, 156
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law reach only the commercial
use of a person's name or likeness "and no more"); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ'g,
727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (N.Y. 2000) (same).
14. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 1988).
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engaging in deceptive business practices.' 5 In addition, the plaintiffs
pursued breach of contract and unjust enrichment causes of action.' 6 The
defendants moved to dismiss all counts of the complaint and the trial
court allowed the motion in its entirety.
On appeal, the Appellate Division first rehearsed the elements of a
claim under section 349 of the General Business Laws: the "plaintiff
must prove that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented,
that it was misleading in a material way, and that the plaintiff suffered
injury as a result of the deceptive act."... "[T]o recover under the statute,"
the court continued, "a plaintiff must prove actual injury, though not
necessarily pecuniary harm."' 9 Assuming the allegations in the complaint
to be true, and affording the plaintiffs "the benefit of every favorable
inference," the court concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged "actionable
deception."2 ° In other words, the court agreed that, if true, Chase's
decision to sell consumers' personal information to third parties,
contrary to the terms of its pledge to protect that information, constituted
an act likely to mislead a consumer acting reasonably under the
circumstances.
The court declined, however, to hold that the plaintiffs had alleged
an "actual injury" as required under the caselaw construing section 349.2
The court stated:
The complaint allege[s] that Chase's "deceptive acts and practices
deceived the plaintiffs and other members of the class, and have
directly, foreseeably and proximately caused actual damages and
injury to the plaintiffs and other members of the class in amounts yet to
2
be determined." These allegations fail[] to allege any actual harm.
The court observed that, even assuming the "class members were
merely offered products and services which they were free to decline[,]"
they suffered no actual harm. 3 Indeed, because the plaintiffs failed to
allege "a single instance where a named plaintiff or any class member
15. The statute declares unlawful "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business,
trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service." Id.
16. See Smith, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
17. See id. at 101-02.
18. Id. at 102.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The court assumed, as the lower court had, that the Smith plaintiffs had received "junk
mail and junk telephone calls." Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 3070/2000, slip op. at 12
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 27, 2000).
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suffered any actual harm due to the receipt of an unwanted telephone
solicitation or a piece of junk mail[J" the trial court "properly dismissed
the plaintiffs' General Business Law causes of action."24
The court also upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' breach of
contract claim. 25 The court concluded that a vague and conclusory
allegation of damage could not support a contract action.26 Even
assuming that the plaintiffs had alleged injury from "invasive and
unsolicited telephone calls," moreover, under New York law, damages
could not be recovered for any emotional distress the plaintiffs had
suffered. 27 Nor could the plaintiffs rely upon profits received by Chase
"to satisfy the damage element of their cause of action, since the
plaintiffs never had any expectation of monetary compensation."28
Accordingly, the trial court properly and correctly dismissed the
plaintiffs' contract claim.
II.

THE IMPORTANCE-AND FRAGILITY-OF INFORMATION PRIVACY

Before exploring Smith's implications for the vindication of privacy
interests under consumer protection laws and statutes containing privacy
protections, I sketch some baseline assumptions about information
privacy from which this discussion proceeds. For purposes of this
Article, I accept certain fundamental suppositions. As an initial matter, I
accept that information privacy promotes distinct societal values by
providing a context that allows, or creating the conditions in which,
individuals may pursue their personal development and interact or
engage with one another in the pursuit of myriad ends. With respect to
personal development, "privacy," as Joseph Kupfer has observed, "is
essential to the ... maintenance of an autonomous self."2 9 The
"autonomous self' refers to "a concept of oneself as a purposeful, selfdetermining, responsible agent."30 The autonomous self is an individual
who conceives of himself or herself as a person in control of his or her
life by virtue of the liberty, among other things, to "rehearse ... thinking

24. Smith, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
25. See id. at 103. In addition, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claim. The court reasoned that those plaintiffs who had purchased goods or services
from the third parties to whom Chase had sold their personal information had no claim for unjust
enrichment because they had received the benefit of those goods or services. See id. at 102-03.
26. See id. at 103.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Joseph Kupfer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Self-Concept, 24 AM. PHIL. Q. 81, 82 (1987).
30. Id.
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and behavior, to try out options without running 'real life' risks"-in
other words, absent interference and free from observation.'
Information privacy also catalyzes interaction and engagement
between and among individuals in a variety of ways. Charles Fried has
explained that privacy "is necessarily related to ends and relations of the
most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust[,]" because
these relations "require a context of privacy or the possibility of privacy
for their existence. 32 Individuals require privacy in commercial
relationships as well. Such relationships-as between contracting or
negotiating parties, for example-are not likely to form absent some
assurance that the parties involved will be able to exercise control over
access to, and the dissemination of, information about themselves and
the nature of their relationship." Thus information privacy is an
indispensable predicate to a range of personal and commercial pursuits,
from the quotidian to the exceptional.34
A breach of information privacy-as represented by, say, the
acquisition of otherwise private information by a second or third partysignifies a loss of control over information. Such a loss of control could
compromise the context that enables an individual to maintain a sense of
autonomy, or the conditions that allow parties to develop a particular
personal or commercial relationship. In the former instance, privacy's
failure undermines, if only to a degree, an individual's ability to
contemplate ways of being without fear of interference. In the latter
instance, privacy's failure threatens to undermine the relationship
itself-and, in addition, the development of like associations in the
future:
[i]f we thought that our every word and deed were public, fear of
disapproval or more tangible retaliation might keep us from doing or
saying things which we would do or say if we could be sure of keeping
them to ourselves or within a circle of those who we know approve or
35
tolerate our tastes.

31. Id. at 83; see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. L.J.
2117, 2124 (2001) (concluding that "uncertainty about pervasive surveillance makes the
development of the subjective self impossible").
32. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968); see also James Rachels, Why
Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIl. AND PUB. AFF. 323, 326 (1975) (arguing that privacy is important
because it enables individuals to form relationships with others).
33. See Carlos Perez-Albuerne & Lawrence Friedman, Privacy Protection for Electronic
Communications and the "Interception-UnauthorizedAccess" Dilemma, 19 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER. & INFO. L. 435, 449-50 (2001) (discussing the relationships that privacy enables).
34. See id. at 450.
35. Fried, supra note 32, at 483-84 (footnote omitted).
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This potentiality recommends privacy as a value worth protecting.
That protection may be accomplished in a variety of ways, such as
making available to individuals who have suffered privacy invasions
some legal means of redress.36
I also accept that the legal bounds of privacy are, at bottom,
socially-constructed, in the very specific sense that the control over
personal information that the law allows is often, if not always,
influenced by societal expectations. As Shaun Spencer has explained,
information privacy in a given instance is typically defined through
public regulation.37 Public regulation tends to track societal expectations,
which in turn vary with the circumstances in which the issue of privacy
is raised.3" Because both the judicial conception of privacy-as reflected
in the invasion of privacy torts and interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution-and the legislative
conception of privacy-as embodied in specific statutory protections for
privacy in certain situations-are subject to diminishment when they
conflict with other societal interests, "[a]ctors and groups powerful
enough to influence social behavior can change society's expectation of
privacy, and thereby change what the law will protect as private."'3 9
Spencer rightly concludes that "[t]he expectation-driven conception
of privacy creates a perverse incentive for businesses to diminish,
proactively, individuals' expectations of privacy., 40 Businesses can
exploit consumers' lack of knowledge about information collection
practices, and the uses to which personal information can be put, through
stated policies and contractual arrangements that promise individuals the
privacy protection that a business believes appropriate-or
commercially expedient.4 This knowledge imbalance leads to a market
failure, for it simply is not possible for individuals who may be affected
by the imbalance in particular instances effectively to organize and,

36. See, e.g., Perez-Albueme & Friedman, supra note 33, at 455 (discussing the importance of
a legal basis to challenge unauthorized disclosure of personal information); see also Charles
Nesson, Threats to Privacy, 68 Soc. RES. 105, 111-12 (2001) (arguing that privacy must be legally
protected); Fried, supra note 32, at 493 (arguing that, absent legal title, a person cannot possess "the
full measure of both the sense and the fact of control" over personal information).
37. See Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 857-58 (2002).

38. See id. at 858-59; see also Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Social Construction of
Privacy, 68 Soc. RES. 221, 228 (2001) (noting that privacy, as a "social construction," will be "as
variable as the forces that create it").
39. Spencer, supra note 37, at 860.
40. Id. at 870 (footnote omitted).
41. See id. at 892-94.
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therefore, counter the information asymmetries created by "unevenly
2
distributed bargaining costs, and disparities in bargaining power.,
It nonetheless remains that businesses might elect to commit, in
some way, to protecting information privacy, perhaps as a policy or as a
pledge if not through a formal contractual agreement. Such a
commitment could serve as an incentive for consumers to patronize
those businesses that appear to respect privacy as opposed to competitors
that promise fewer or no privacy protections-or that choose not to take
a position on the information privacy of their customers. Given popular
concern about abuses of personal consumer information, 3 a business
reasonably could deem such a position to be potentially advantageous in
a competitive market. Indeed, companies like Earthlink, an Internet
Service Provider, have advertised their commitment to protecting the
information privacy of their customers."
Regardless of the existence of a contractual agreement, at the point
where a pledge to protect information privacy is tested through a
consumer protection claim alleging deceptive practices, or some other
statutory action, privacy is at risk. In such a case, the court is
responsible, in the first instance, for determining whether a defendant
should be held to honor a commitment to protect information privacy,
simply by ruling on the question of whether a cause of action predicated
on a privacy violation-as in Smith-may proceed to trial.
Notwithstanding the importance of information privacy to so many other
aspects of our lives, as reflected in our laws and our beliefs, as well as
the studies of numerous commentators, governmental actors have often
proved themselves unwilling to protect privacy when faced with4 5
countervailing interests, thus threatening to further diminish its scope.
As we shall see, Smith demonstrates that one of the challenges for
privacy advocates is to persuade judges, no less than legislators, that
information privacy is a value of continuing significance, and that the
least that can be done to respect its worth is to allow plaintiffs the
opportunity to pursue privacy violations that fall within the reach of such
statutes as consumer protection laws.
42. id. at 891 (footnote omitted).
43. Consider, for example, the controversy surrounding the plans of Internet marketer,
Doubleclick, to merge previously anonymous online information with personally identifiable data.
See id. at 866-67.
44. See Privacy Policy, at http://www.earthlink.net/about/policies/privacy/ (describing
Earthlink privacy policy). See also Steven A. Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy
Entitlement in Cyberspace, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 877, 884 (2001) (discussing privacy guarantees
found on financial services firm websites).
45. See Spencer, supra note 2, at 554.
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III.

THE SMITH COURT'S FAILURES

With this understanding of information privacy in mind, the Smith
decision may be critiqued with respect to its doctrinal shortcomings,
which reflect a failure to apply established assumptions about allegations
of injury to a case arising from a commitment to respect privacy. A
discussion of these doctrinal shortcomings leads in turn to an exploration
of the Smith court's failure to acknowledge the normative arguments for
recognizing the plaintiffs' claim under New York's consumer protection
law-a failure of which privacy advocates must take notice if
information privacy is to receive the recognition it warrants.46
A.

Defining Actual Harm

In Smith, the court apparently concluded that the plaintiffs could
not claim actual harm because they did not allege that they had suffered
any loss of property or money, or had been compelled to do anythingsuch as spend money on products or services-in response to the
uninvited commercial solicitations they received after Chase sold their
personal information to third parties.47 In light of the caselaw discussing
the requisites for a claim under the General Business Law, this
conclusion is far from inescapable. The New York state courts have
construed the law as encompassing "deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any
service" in the State of New York. To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant engaged "in an act or practice that is
deceptive or misleading in49 a material way and that plaintiff has been
injured by reason thereof.,
In defining injury as actual harm under the statute, the courts have
rejected a "deception as injury" theory. In Small v. Lorillard Tobacco
Co., for example, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants' deception
regarding the addictive properties of cigarettes prevented the plaintiffs
from making "free and informed choices as consumers[,]" and that
consumers "who buy a product that they would not have purchased,
46. In the Smith appeal, counsel for the plaintiffs did not advance any comprehensive privacybased theory in support of their claim. See Brief on Behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14-20, Smith
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 741 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (No. 03015) (discussing injury
requirement under New York consumer protection law).
47. See Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 741 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
48. Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., 720 N.E.2d 892, 897 (N.Y. 1999).
49. Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 647 N.E.2d
741, 744 (N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Stutman v. Chemical Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 611
(N.Y. 2000).
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absent a manufacturer's deceptive commercial practices, have suffered
an injury under [the] General Business Law."5 ° Dismissing this theory,
the New York Court of Appeals explained that it failed to present any
"manifestation" of harm;5 had the plaintiffs sought recovery for "the
cost of cigarettes" or "injury to their health," they would have satisfied
the actual harm requirement.52 Either factual allegation would have
represented an objectively identifiable manifestation of harm caused by
the defendants' conduct.
As Small illustrates, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate the
appearance of an injury from deceptive conduct, and not necessarily that
the injury was of a particular kind. Pursuant to this reasoning, the
plaintiffs in Smith stated a sufficient claim under the consumer
protection law. Though the claim was inartfully pled, the court
recognized that the plaintiffs could be understood to have alleged that
they had received telephone and mail solicitations offering "products
and services which they were free to decline. 53 On these allegations, the
deceptive conduct-the disclosure and sale of personal information to
third parties notwithstanding a promise not to disclose or sell that
information-was not synonymous with the plaintiffs' injury. Rather,
that deceptive conduct causally led to a discrete injury: an invasion of
the plaintiffs' privacy by third parties, who upon acquiring the plaintiffs'
personal information used it to target them with commercial solicitations
in the form of unwanted telephone calls and junk mail. On the facts of
Smith, the receipt of the unwanted solicitations was the manifestation of
the harm to the plaintiffs' privacy that they suffered as a result of the
disclosure of their personal information. 4
It is necessary, but not sufficient, that the deceptive conduct be
distinct from its injurious effect on the plaintiffs' privacy: the harm also
must bear some relation to the consumer transaction at issue. Here again,
50. Small, 720 N.E.2d at 898.
51. See id. at 898.
52. Id.
53. Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 741 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
54. This is not to say that mere disclosure of personal information does not signify a loss of
control sufficient to compromise information privacy; the plaintiffs in Smith arguably suffered harm
merely by Chase's disclosure of their personal information, even before they received unwanted
calls and mail. But that privacy injury would not be cognizable under the General Business Law if
the disclosure remained unknown to the individual whose privacy was compromised, as the injury
did not (on the facts of Smith) manifest itself in any objectively identifiable way. For purposes of
the consumer protection law, the receipt of unwanted solicitations need not represent the extent of
the ways in which a dishonored commitment to protect privacy injury could manifest itself. Any
public recognition evidencing the acquisition of personal information by a third party likely would
suffice.
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Small is instructive. In that case, the court reiterated that an alleged harm
need not be pecuniary in nature.5 The court had no doubt that an injury
to the plaintiffs' health, for example, would have been cognizable under
the consumer protection law, and it suggested that an injury that
manifested itself in the form of the dollar cost of cigarettes would have
qualified as actual harm.56 Both of these harms were connected to an
interest underlying the consumer transaction at issue in Smallrepresentations about the quality of the product, cigarettes. Similarly, in
Smith, the manifestation of harm-the receipt of the unwanted
commercial solicitations-was connected to an interest at stake in the
original transaction: representations by Chase about the quality of the
information privacy the plaintiffs could expect to enjoy.
Thus, there existed, under settled caselaw in New York, a doctrinal
basis for the Smith plaintiffs' claim of actual harm. The Smith court
apparently misconstrued precedent in concluding that the plaintiffs could
satisfy the harm requirement only if they asserted that they had lost
property or money, or been compelled to respond in some way to the
commercial solicitations they received from the third parties that had
purchased their personal information. But identification of the court's
erroneous reasoning is not the end of the inquiry. Courts play a
gatekeeping role with respect to the claims that will be recognized under
the General Business Law,5 and so it remains to address the larger issue
whether, even assuming the correct application of precedent to the facts
in Smith, the court should have recognized the plaintiffs' claim under the
statute.
B.

Normative Arguments for Recognizing Information Privacy
Violations as Actionable Under Consumer ProtectionLaws

There was no dispute in Smith that, assuming the facts were true,
Chase's conduct constituted a deceptive practice under New York's
consumer protection law. The only question was whether the plaintiffs
had alleged, or could allege, actual harm. As discussed above, under
consumer protection caselaw in New York, the plaintiffs in Smith had
sufficiently alleged an injury. 8 In this section, I argue that, in view of the
importance and fragility of information privacy, the court should have
ruled that the plaintiffs' allegations stated a cause of action under the

55.
56.
57.
58.

See Small, 720 N.E.2d at 897.
See id. at 898.
See, e.g., Teller v. Bill Hayes, Ltd., 630 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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General Business Law. This conclusion finds support in arguments
based upon deterrence, expressive theory and fairness, none of which
would offend the principle of legislative supremacy in lawmaking.
1. The Deterrence Rationale
A deterrence rationale supports the adequacy of the Smith
plaintiffs' claim under New York's General Business Law. Consumer
protection statutes like New York's regulate the commitments made by
commercial actors to consumers, to ensure that such actors deal with
consumers fairly and without resort to sharp practices.59 To this end,
consumer protection laws function as a commitment-enforcement
regime in the context of consumer transactions. Such laws provide a
legal means through which individuals injured in some way by a
commercial actor's deceptive conduct can seek redress, and the
possibility of redress through damages or injunctive relief in the event
deception is found serves to deter commercial actors from dishonoring
their commitments in the first place.60
Consider a hypothetical case involving a consumer's purchase of,
say, a kitchen mixer. The seller advertises the mixer as capable of dicing
tomatoes. If the seller's claim is deceptive-if the mixer by its design
cannot really dice tomatoes-then the seller has dishonored its
commitment to the consumer, who may pursue a consumer protection
action against the seller under New York law. 6 ' The availability of an
action for damages, as well as possibility of recovering enhanced
damages if the deception was willful, in addition to attorney's fees and
costs, serves not only to provide full compensation for the consumer, but
to present the possibility of a judgment against the seller of greater
weight than that resulting from liability under an ordinary contract suit,
59. The New York statute, like the vast majority of state consumer protection laws, does not
reach consumer-to-consumer transactions. See S. Lee Richardson, State and Local Consumer
Protection, in

REGULATION

AND

CONSUMER

PROTECTION:

POLITICS,

BUREAUCRACY

&

ECONOMICS 403, 411-12 (3d ed., Kenneth J. Meier et al. eds., 1998).
60. The legislative history of New York's General Business Law, for example, "makes plain
that [it] was intended to 'afford a practical means of halting consumer frauds at their incipiency."'
Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 647 N.E.2d 741, 744
(N.Y. 1995). The statute's broad language "was intended to provide a 'strong deterrent against
deceptive business practices."' Genesco Entm't v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(footnote omitted).
61. There can be little doubt that a consumer would have a claim in this instance. Among the
trade practices traditionally considered to be deceptive are false advertising and misrepresentation
of the origin, nature, or quality of a particular product. See Teller, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 773. "Generally,
claims under the statute are available to an individual consumer who falls victim to
misrepresentations made by a seller of consumer goods through false or misleading advertising."
Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., 720 N.E.2d 892, 897 (N.Y. 1999).
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with damages likely limited to the cost of the mixer itself.62 The deterrent

effect of the consumer protection action is further enhanced by the
possibility of future actions against similarly deceptive sellers.
Not all deceptive acts and practices are necessarily worthy of the
deterrent effect the General Business Law ostensibly provides. The
courts have reasonably limited the law's reach to those deceptive acts
and practices that affect the public interest, which does not include acts
or practices occurring in the context of "[p]rivate transactions not of a
recurring nature or without ramifications for the public at large. 63
Regardless of the deceit associated with a transaction, when the only
parties "truly affected" by an alleged misrepresentation are the plaintiff
and the defendant, the plaintiff cannot state a claim under New York's
General Business Law. 6
It may be said, then, that a deceptive act or practice merits
deterrence if its consequences will be widely felt among consumers and
potential consumers. This is true no matter the subject of a commercial
actor's commitment to a consumer. A seller's misrepresentation in the
kitchen mixer transaction would qualify as an act worthy of deterrence
because its effect may extend beyond the parties in a single case; there
are many consumers who might be persuaded to purchase the mixer
based upon those misrepresentations. This same reasoning applies to the
subject of the commitment in Smith-personal information about the
plaintiffs.65 Chase's failure to maintain its commitment to protect its
customers' privacy affected not simply those individuals who joined the
plaintiffs' class, but any other Chase customer who was also deceived by
Chase-and, of course, any individual who might suffer in the wake of a
similarly disregarded commitment to privacy.
In addition to the breadth of the potential harm resulting from
Chase's actions in Smith, the quality of the harm suggests that the failure
to honor commitments to protect privacy is particularly worthy of
deterrence. While the public harm caused by a kitchen mixer that does
not operate as promised is not insignificant, it is not as potentially
damaging as the harm resulting from the privacy violation for which the
Smith plaintiffs sought redress.66 Given the value of information privacy
62. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
17-18 (1981) (describing expectation damages in contract).
63. Genesco Entm 't, 593 F. Supp. at 752.
64. See id. (concluding that the rental of a baseball stadium "is not an ordinary or recurring
consumer transaction").
65. See Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 741 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
66. One might argue that the values represented by information privacy and a kitchen mixer,
respectively, are incommensurable. See Spencer, supra note 2, at 554. See generally Cass R.
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to the development of the self and to the development of personal and
commercial relationships, the social costs of further erosion of privacy
expectations likely are, in the aggregate, greater than the social costs
associated with kitchen mixers that do not dice tomatoes. 6 1 It follows
that, in the interest of deterring commercial actors from reneging on
privacy commitments and thereby undermining privacy, a court should
allow a consumer protection claim based upon a dishonored privacy
commitment to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage, just as it
would allow the kitchen mixer claim to proceed.
The Smith court's failure to sanction the plaintiffs' claim
compounds the negative consequences for information privacy created
by Chase's actions. First, the decision itself exacerbates the erosion of
information privacy by contributing to the construction of expectations
about privacy's scope. The court acknowledged that Chase's actions
constituted deceptive conduct, yet denied that such conduct warranted
redress under the General Business Law; the decision implies that
information privacy is not an interest worthy of protection and that
dishonored privacy commitments in any event cause no injury of which
the law should take notice, thereby undermining efforts to deter actors
from dishonoring commitments to respect privacy. The case may well
influence the expectations individuals have about the value of
information privacy in similar circumstances, and also encourage
commercial actors in Chase's position either to advertise information
privacy as limited in precisely the ways the Smith decision suggests, or
in the future repudiate similar privacy assurances with impunity.
Second, so far as its impact on future cases is concerned, the Smith
court's failure to recognize the plaintiffs' claims as actionable under the
consumer protection statute undermines any deterrent effect that might
be gained from the undisputed conclusion that Chase dishonored its
commitment to respect privacy. Which is to say, the fact that the court
concluded that the bank's failure to honor its commitment was deceptive
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994). If that were so,
then it likely would be because the value of information privacy is incalculable in dollar terms. See
James H. Moor, Toward a Theory of Privacy in the Information Age, in CYBERETHICS: SOCIAL &
MORAL ISSUES IN THE COMPUTER AGE 200, 205-06 (Robert M. Baird, et al. eds., 2000) (arguing
that privacy is a good of both intrinsic and instrumental value). And if that were so, wouldn't we all
agree that the value of information privacy, like the value of, say, breathable air, would be greater
than that of the kitchen mixer? See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS (1995) (discussing the current means for allowing the market to determine value and
the need for a consideration of social value).
67. See DEBORAH G. JOHNSON, COMPUTER ETHICS 127 (3d ed. 2001) (arguing that
information privacy is "a social good in its own right and more important than other social goods
such as efficiency and better consumer services").
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under the consumer protection law is well and good but essentially
meaningless, because the court declined also to acknowledge that the
injury caused by the deception was within the reach of the statute. As a
general matter, the respect accorded information privacy will reflect the
availability of a remedy for its denigration; 68 absent such a remedy, the
value of information privacy can only be diminished.69
The deterrence rationale for allowing the Smith case to proceed is,
in the end, straightforward: when privacy is promised and then
compromised in consumer transactions, consumer protection laws, like
New York's, provide a viable means through which the deception can be
addressed and in the future deterred. Such a ruling does not require that
privacy be considered a "right" under ordinary consumer protection
laws. A court need only accept the propositions that information privacy
is an important societal value, and that consumer protection laws should
be available to remedy privacy violations in the context of consumer
transactions in the same way that those laws are available to remedy
deceptions concerning a wide variety of consumer interests, from
kitchen mixers that dice tomatoes to fair debt collection practices and
fair insurance practices. 70
2. The Expressive Rationale
Expressive theory also supports the argument that the Smith
plaintiffs stated a sufficient claim under New York's General Business
Law. The expressive rationale is premised on the view that the meaning
of action is as important as what the action accomplishes. Actions, in
other words, can violate governing public norms not only by creating
concrete costs (with which a deterrence rationale is primarily concerned)
but by conveying a meaning that "expresses inappropriate respect" for
the relevant governing norms. 7' Expressive theories of action "hold
people accountable for the public meanings of their actions[," by
serving as a means by which we may evaluate how well those actions

68. Cf. Joseph William Singer, Approaches to Teaching Property: Starting Property, 46 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 565, 575 (2002) (observing that "rights are defined by the scope of the remedies the
law will grant to right-holders").
69. See supra Part Ii.
70. See Teller v. Bill Hayes, Ltd., 630 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (listing some
of the transactions deemed cognizable under New York's General Business Law).
71. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism,27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 755 (1998). Notably, expressive theories "do not deny
that the consequences matter. Rather, they tell us why the consequences matter, and which
consequences matter." Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1514 (2000).
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"express attitudes that we ought to have" with respect to particular
substantive values.72
An expressive harm occurs when a particular action undermines
collective understandings as reflected in governing public norms.73 A
person suffers expressive harm, for instance, when an actor treats her
according to principles that "express negative or inappropriate attitudes
toward her."74 The expressive harm results from the meaning an action
expresses-that is, from the action itself. The nonexpressive harm, in
contrast, is simply a but-for consequence of the action.75 In determining
whether an action's meaning actually undermines relevant public norms,
the action must be assessed within an interpretive context; as the leading
expressive theorists Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes have
explained, this is because "meanings are a result of the ways in which
actions fit with (or7 fail
to fit with) other meaningful norms and practices
6
community.
in [a]
To illustrate the concept of expressive harm, consider an example
in the context of election law-specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court's
per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore.77 Heather Gerken has proposed that
we might look to the expressive rationale in an effort to understand the
Court's determination that the ballot recount violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. "It may be," she
suggests, "that the arbitrary and capricious treatment of ballots the
Justices perceived in Florida convey[ed] an improper message about the
value of one's vote., 71 In light of the democratic norm that "voters have
confidence in the sanctity of the ballots they cast, which in turn requires
that state officials accord adequate respect to those ballots by treating
similarly situated ballots alike[,]" it follows that the differential
treatment of the presidential ballots at issue resulted in an expressive
harm, because that action expressed the attitude that similarly situated
ballots need not be treated alike.79

72. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 71, at 1513. By "attitudes," expressive theorists refer to
the "complex set of dispositions to perceive, have emotions, deliberate, and act in ways oriented
toward [a] person." Id. at 1509.
73. See Pildes, supra note 71, at 755.
74. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 71, at 1527.
75. See id. at 1530.
76. Id. at 1525.
77. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
78. Heather K. Gerken, New Wine in Old Bottles: A Comment on Richard Hasen's and
Richard Briffault's Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407, 411 (2001).
79. Id. Importantly, Gerken is not saying that the ballots in question in Bush v. Gore were
similarly situated in fact, just that the Court may have perceived them as being so. See id. at n.16.
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Consumer protection laws like New York's embody governing
public norms regarding the attitudes commercial actors should express
toward individuals with respect to consumer transactions. By prohibiting
"[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or
commerce or in the furnishing of any service[,]"8 ° the General Business
Law reflects the principle that commitments made in consumer
transactions should be honored. The law accordingly proscribes actions
that indicate that a commitment made in the context of a consumer
transaction-be it related to a kitchen mixer or to information privacyneed not be respected.
As noted above, expressive harm follows from conduct that
expresses an incorrect attitude in the context of governing public
norms;" it does not lie in the consequences of the action at issue.
Accordingly, in Smith, the failure of Chase to honor its commitment to
privacy by selling personal information to third parties amounted to an
expressive harm regardless of the consequences of the sale of that
information. The expressive harm derives from the attitude Chase
expressed by its actions vis-i-vis the plaintiffs' personal informationfrom Chase's failure to honor its promise to the plaintiffs to not convey
that information to third parties.
By failing to allow the Smith plaintiffs an opportunity to proceed to
trial on their consumer protection claim, the court caused an additional
expressive harm. A judicial proceeding represents an avenue through
which expressive interests may be vindicated via public condemnation
of those persons who express attitudes that disrespect particular values.
Judicial recognition of expressive interests and condemnation of
expressive harm serve:
to ensure that political and social relationships remain constituted
according to the principles previously thought to govern them. This is
why, it seems, even token compensation makes wealthy landowners
more accepting of redistribution. Compensation, even if not
commensurate with loss, expresses recognition that the State is
inflicting serious harm on individuals in the service of justifiable
ends. 2
The availability of "'expressive legal remedies"' is important
"because they express recognition of injury and reaffirmation of the

80. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 1988).
81. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
82. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 71, at 1529 (footnote omitted).
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underlying normative principles for how the relevant relationships are to
be constituted. ' 3
Assuming that information privacy is an important societal valueand a scholarly consensus appears to indicate that it is8-and that a
dishonored commitment to respect privacy is otherwise actionable under
the consumer protection law-as shown above85-allowing the Smith
suit to proceed would create an opportunity for the plaintiffs to vindicate
the expressive harm created by Chase's conduct. That vindication would
be accomplished, if the plaintiffs prevailed, through the public
condemnation of Chase via a finding by a judge or jury that Chase was
liable to the plaintiffs for breaching its privacy commitment.86 Compared
to the way in which expressive harms related to other societal interestssuch as the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, for
example-are vindicated through judicial pronouncements and
dispositions, 7 allowing the plaintiff's claim simply to survive would
represent an uncomplicated acknowledgement of the value of
information privacy, and of commitments not to forsake it.
3. The Fairness Rationale
In addition, basic fairness concerns support the viability of the
Smith plaintiffs' claim under New York's General Business Law. I refer
here to the relatively simple conception of fairness implicated by the
possibility of a windfall-by "[a]n unanticipated benefit, usually in the
form of a profit and not caused by the recipient. ',,8 The windfall problem
is addressed in contractual contexts by the law governing unjust
enrichment, which holds that restitution is required if a party is "allowed
to retain without paying for it some benefit that had been conferred."'8 9
The problem may also arise at the doctrinal level. Consider, for example,
Todd Rakoff's proposal that contracts of adhesion be presumed

83.

Id.

84. See, e.g., RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 27 (2d ed. 2002) (noting the "pervasive viewpoint is that many forms of privacy merit

protection").
85. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of actual harm
under New York's General Business Law).

86. See Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 833, 856 (2000) (discussing public finding of liability as the "linchpin" of the
expressive legal remedy in the criminal context).
87. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 71, at 1533-45 (discussing the expressive dimension of

equal protection jurisprudence).
88.
89.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1594 (7th ed. 1999).
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 103 (2d ed. 1990).
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unenforceable. 9° An objection to that presumption is that it might result
in a windfall to the adherent]' The objection supposes, in other words,
that the potential creation of a windfall, by operation of a legal
presumption, presents a problem of fairness when applied in particular
cases.
If the bestowal of a windfall achieved through a legal presumption
raises a fairness concern, so too should a windfall achieved through a
court's gatekeeping decision, on a motion to dismiss, to decline to
recognize an otherwise valid consumer protection claim based upon the
defendant's failure to honor a privacy commitment. Assuming the facts
alleged to be true, a court should hesitate to deny a plaintiff who satisfies
the technical legal requisites for a consumer protection claim an
opportunity to proceed to trial when to do so would in effect bestow a
windfall on the defendant. In viewing a consumer protection claim
premised on a dishonored privacy commitment in this way, the court
may avoid becoming the instrument of unfairness, in the case at hand
and in future cases relying on the instant case as precedent.
This is the essence of the fairness concern raised by the court's
decision in Smith. As discussed above, the plaintiffs alleged both that
Chase's conduct qualified as deceptive 9 and that they suffered actual
harm as a result. 93 To deny the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove Chase's
deceptive conduct and the harm caused thereby at trial indisputably
results in a benefit to Chase-the freedom to ignore its own commitment
to respect the plaintiff's personal information and, indeed, to profit on
information-which, assuming the facts and the reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom in the plaintiffs' favor, Chase did not earn. It is one
thing to grant Chase this freedom after a trial in which the plaintiffs
failed to prove their case, yet another when the benefit is received purely
through the grace of a judicial decision whose effect might extend to
other entities and institutions similarly situated, to future deals for
personal information that contradict commitments to respect privacy.

90.

See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.

REV. 1173 (1983).
91. See id. at 1243-44 (acknowledging and refuting the potential fairness problem created by
a presumption that would result on a windfall to one party to a contract).
92. See Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 741 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(agreeing that the plaintiffs had alleged "actionable deception").
93. See supra Part Ili.A (discussing understanding of actual harm under New York's General
Business Law as applied to Smith facts).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:651

4. The Majoritarian Concern
In a case like Smith, the majoritarian concern suggests that, even
assuming the injury the plaintiffs suffered qualifies as actual harm, the
court should decline to recognize the claim because privacy interests are
more appropriately protected through legislative rather than judicial
action. The underlying assumption is that questions about the regulation
of privacy interests-like questions about the regulation of other societal
values-ought to be resolved through the political process.94 The
majoritarian concern rests on the notion of legislative supremacy in
lawmaking, itself a reflection of the "preoccupation in American law
with constraining judicial discretion because of the fear that judicial
lawmaking will compromise democracy and undermine the rule of
law."95 This conception of the judicial task embodies a sharp distinction
between judicial work and legislative work,96 and the respective insights
each branch may bring to bear on an issue of public import. 97
To the majoritarian concern at least three responses can be made.
First, recognition of a consumer protection claim in cases like Smith
would not undermine legislative supremacy, as it would represent a
rather minor step in the evolutionary process of statutory construction
that obtains with respect to innumerable legislative enactments. As a
general matter, a court faced for the first time with a statute will, in
construing the law, articulate an analytical framework that will govern
the statute's application and provide notice as to how the statute will
operate in practice.98 And, as new factual scenarios arise, a court may
94. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Single-Sex "Marriage":The Role of the Courts, 2001 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1013 (2001) (condemning judicial decision-making in such areas as abortion, prayer in
schools, pornography and same-sex marriage). Much discourse on the merits of legal protection for
information privacy assumes a lead role for legislative efforts. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Anne
Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation (AEI-Brookings Joint Center
for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 01-14, Oct. 2001).
95. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1995).
96. See id. at 595.
97. See Charles H. Baron, Pleading for Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Courts, 19 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1997) (cataloging strengths and weaknesses of courts and legislatures as
lawmaking bodies).
98. This is a descriptive claim. As Guido Calabresi has observed, statutory construction is "an
almost unavoidable judicial task. Words do not interpret themselves." GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31 (1982); see also Richard A. Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 179, 187 (1986) (noting that, "[n]o matter how clear [a] text seems, it must be
interpreted (or decoded) like any other communication"). The way in which courts should approach
the initial attempt to construe a statute and, in the process, articulate an analytical framework that
will guide application of the statute, is a source of much debate. See id. at 192-99 (discussing
approaches to statutory construction). For purposes of this discussion, we need only assume that a
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tinker with the established analytical framework so as to remain faithful
to the statute from which it derives-thus, in Small v. Lorillard Tobacco
Co., the New York Court of Appeals took the opportunity to clarify the
understanding of actual harm that should control under the General
Business Law. 99 Absent legislative correction of a court's analytical
framework, that framework is entitled to deference.' °°
On this view, a decision by the Smith court, in its role as cause of
action gatekeeper, to allow the plaintiffs' claim to proceed would not
threaten legislative supremacy. The plaintiffs' claim, after all, satisfied
the elemental requisites for a consumer protection action under existing
caselaw, and several normative rationales would have justified
recognizing that claim under New York's General Business Law. Unlike
Small, the case presented no novel theory requiring reconsideration of
the basic analytical framework for evaluating consumer protection
claims; indeed, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed would have
represented little more than the application of the established analytical
framework, as articulated in Small, to an essentially unremarkable
factual scenario. This is what courts do all the time in a wide array of
cases; the legislature would, as always, be free to respond if there were
some reason to believe the court had gone astray.
Second, even if privacy is understood as a value whose particular
attributes commend its regulation by legislatures rather than courts, that
still is not reason enough for the court to decline to act in the absence of
legislative action. To be sure, a legislative response to the problem posed
by deceptive conduct like Chase's in Smith might be preferable, and
there is some precedent for legislative protection of information privacy.
Congress, for example, has passed legislation expressly aimed at
protecting the privacy of video tape rental records. 0' ' It remains, though,
that upholding the Smith plaintiffs' claim would serve simply to preserve
the legal status quo with respect to an important societal value until the
legislature takes action, one way or another; as noted above, any other

court has articulated an analytical framework, as the New York Court of Appeals has with respect to
the General Business Law.
99. See Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., 720 N.E.2d 892, 898 (N.Y. 1999).
100. See CALABRESI, supra note 98, at 31-32 (discussing the judicial-legislative dynamic in
statutory construction). In the area of consumer protection, there has consistently been a great deal
of interplay between courts and legislatures over the reach of the law. See J.R. Franke & D.A.
Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative
Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347,424 (1992).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000); see also Spencer, supra note 37, at 857-58 (discussing
origins of Video Protection Privacy Act).
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position vis-A-vis information privacy would have the effect 02of
contributing to its erosion by influencing expectations about its scope.1
Third, as a historical matter, the protection of information privacy
has never been viewed as beyond the domain of the judiciary. More than
a century ago, courts developed the invasion of privacy torts, the origins
of which may be traced to the seminal law review article by Warren and
Brandeis, '°3 in which the authors argued that the common law should
recognize an invasion of privacy tort to "protect the privacy of the
individual from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the
photographer, or the possessor of any other modem device for recording
or reproducing scenes or sounds. ' ' Courts in a majority of states
adopted these torts into their common law, providing a means by which
individuals could seek redress for incidents involving intrusion or
eavesdropping on one's "seclusion,"'0 5 or for disclosure of one's private
information.'0 Though in some states, like New York, the adoption of
privacy torts resulted from legislative rather than judicial action,' 7 still
the efforts of courts to recognize the importance of information privacy
through the common law evidences their competence to address such
matters.
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SMITH

Smith v. Chase Manhattan, though just one decision from a midlevel appeals court, may well have implications in cases involving
information privacy both within and without the context of consumer
transactions. Whether a court in a given case adheres to what Ronald
Dworkin has called the "strict" form of stare decisis, which obliges
judges to follow the earlier decisions of certain courts, or the "relaxed"
form, which "demands only that a judge give some weight to past
decisions on the same issue,"'0 " the key is a factual similarity to an
earlier case. With respect to Smith, there are at least two similar factual
scenarios that may arise: one in which a plaintiff claims a commercial
actor violated a commitment to respect privacy; and one in which a
102. See supra Part III.B.I.
103. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). On the history and influence of The Right to Privacy, see Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis
and Warren's The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623
(2002).
104. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 103, at 206.
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
106. See id. § 652D.
107. See Bratman, supra note 103, at 641.
108. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 25 (1986).
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plaintiff alleges an information privacy violation arising under a statute
that seeks to establish some protection for information privacy. I address
each scenario in turn.
A.

Commitments to Respect Privacy Under Consumer ProtectionLaws

The Smith decision may be particularly significant in factually
similar cases arising under other states' consumer protection statutes.' 9
New York's General Business Law resembles many other states'
consumer protection laws in generally prohibiting unfair or deceptive
acts and practices in trade or commerce."0 These statutes correspond in
scope to the Federal Trade Commission Act,"' and many state statutes
mirror the federal law's terms." 2 Indeed, nearly every state has enacted a
consumer protection law proscribing, in one form or another, unfair or
deceptive conduct in consumer transactions." 3
In light of the textual similarities between and among the state and
federal consumer protection schemes in most states, courts will often
look for guidance in construing consumer protection laws to the
decisional law of their sibling state courts and federal courts."' Consider
Chase v. Dorais, ' in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in a
case of first impression, sought to determine the scope of "trade and
commerce" for purposes of New Hampshire's consumer protection
law. ' 6 The New Hampshire statute prohibits any unfair or deceptive
' 7
practice in the conduct of any "trade or commerce" within the state.
The Chase court without hesitation turned to the "well developed body
of law defining trade and commerce in Massachusetts where the
consumer protection statute ... contains exactly the same definition of
109. Smith appears to be the first case addressing the issue of a breached commitment to
protect information privacy.
110. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 610/9 (1993) (prohibiting "[ulnfair or deceptive acts and
practices"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(a) (2003) (declaring unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2 (1995)
(prohibiting "any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce").
11I. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
112. See MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 120 (3d ed. 1999).
113. See id. (discussing the varieties of so-called "little FTC acts"). Most state statutes differ
from the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Act in providing for private remedies. See Franke &
Ballam, supra note 100, at 357.
114. Some state statutes expressly provide that courts should be guided in construing the law
by decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 358-A:13 (1995).
115. 448 A.2d 390 (N.H. 1982).
116. Seeid.at391.
117. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 358-A:2 (1995).
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trade and commerce.""' In the end, the Chase court relied exclusively
upon Massachusetts caselaw to establish the reach of the New
Hampshire consumer protection statute." 9
Unsurprisingly, given the correspondence in the language of
consumer protection statutes and the tendency of courts to use as
guidance the decisional law from other states and the federal courts,
consumer protection claims also share common elements across
jurisdictional borders. As under New York's General Business Law, for
example, consumers raising claims under the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act must demonstrate that they suffered "injury or loss" as a
result of a defendant's allegedly deceptive conduct."' ° A similar
consumer injury requirement also obtains under federal law.'2 '
It is no great leap to suppose that a court facing, as a matter of first
impression, the question whether a commercial actor's alleged violation
of a commitment to respect privacy amounts to an actionable consumer
protection claim would look with interest to Smith. Though in some
states, like Massachusetts, the court could rely upon caselaw holding
that an injury need not amount to a specific economic loss to be
actionable under the consumer protection statute,'22 to the extent that
question is not settled-or, indeed, to the extent a defendant seeks to
revisit the issue-Smith may prove influential. If, moreover, it happens
that businesses, spurred by a perceived consumer interest in privacy
protection, seek to follow Earthlink's lead'23 and promote privacy
assurances in connection with the receipt of their services, the Smith
decision may come to be regarded as a benchmark for determining
whether such assurances can be the subject of a consumer protection
action should a business renege on its commitment.

118. Chase,448 A.2d at 391 (citation omitted).
119. See Chroniak v. Golden Inv. Corp., 983 F.2d 1140, 1146 n.11 (Ist Cir. 1993) (noting that
"New Hampshire courts have invited interpretive comparisons with the 'well developed' caselaw
construing the analogous Massachusetts 'unfair and deceptive practices' act").
120. See Citaramanis v. Hallowell, 613 A.2d 964, 968 (Md. 1992).
121. See Chroniak, 983 F.2d at 1146.
122. See Leardi v. Brown, 474 N.E.2d 1094, 1101-03 (Mass. 1985).
123. See Privacy Policy, supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing Earthlink's privacy
policy). As Steven Hetcher has noted, "websites whose customers are more demanding of privacy
will be more likely to provide greater privacy protections." Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social
Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 149, 175 (2001). Nonetheless, he
continues, "there is great controversy as to whether there has been an increase in the supply of
privacy respect." Id.
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Privacy Violations Outside the Consumer ProtectionContext

The Smith decision could also affect the judicial approach to
alleged privacy violations that arise in factual circumstances outside of
the consumer protection context. A court could rely upon Smith's
understanding of the structure of a privacy injury in construing statutes
that contain privacy protections and either require, or are construed to
require, actual harm as an element of a successful claim. Recall that the
Smith court essentially adopted the view that neither disclosure nor the
immediate effect of disclosure, though arguably privacy violations,
necessarily amounted to actual harm. 2 This was so, apparently, because
the plaintiffs' receipt of unwanted solicitations did not cause them to
lose any property or money, to spend any money, or alter their lives in
any way.'2"5 Under Smith, then, a privacy injury is narrowly defined:
assuming that harm must be shown, a privacy violation will be
actionable only if, as a result of the violation, an individual suffers a
tangible loss or is compelled to take some responsive action.
As explained above, in reaching this conclusion the Smith court
misapplied precedent concerning the requirements of the consumer
protection law.' 26 New York law requires only that plaintiffs point to
some manifestation of harm in order to evidence the consequence of a
deceptive act, such as the disclosure of personal information.' 27 The court
failed to understand that the unwanted solicitations the plaintiffs
received evidenced a specific harm caused by a privacy violation-the
loss of their personal information-even if the violation did not cost
them property or money, or compel them to respond in some way. This
failure might have been avoided, of course, had the Smith court
appreciated the ways in which such privacy injuries affect the integrity
of information privacy and tend to undermine the values that privacy
promotes-had the court appreciated that the unwanted solicitations
received by the Smith plaintiffs were the manifestation of a loss with real
consequences for both the individuals involved and the value of
information privacy to others similarly situated.'2"
124. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
125. See Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 741 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
126. See supra notes 110-124 and accompanying text (analyzing alleged consumer protection
violation in Smith under standards established in caselaw).
127. Recall that, in Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., 720 N.E.2d 892 (N.Y. 1999),
allegations by the plaintiffs that their health had suffered would have sufficed as a manifestation of
the consequences of the cigarette manufacturers' deceptive conduct. See id. at 898.
128. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing the potential effects of
information privacy violations on personal development and the development of personal and
commercial relationships).
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Flawed though it may be, the court's reasoning in Smith is not
without a certain appeal: in many areas of the law, harm has been
understood as necessarily connected to some tangible loss, and the
receipt of unwanted solicitations, in the court's view, simply did not
qualify. 2 9 The Smith court endorsed a conception of harm that serves to
limit the scope of particular causes of action for damages; the court
essentially balanced against the need for deterrence or the expressive
vindication of certain values or an appreciation of fairness such concerns
as certainty and efficiency-the need to circumscribe the conduct that
may be transformed into a source of liability.'3 ° Courts sensitive to such
a balance, and lacking any specific guidance from the legislature as to its
intent, might well be influenced by the Smith court's analysis of privacy
injuries in construing statutes that seek to protect privacy to conclude
that privacy violations must result in strictly tangible losses or some kind
of compelled action to be cognizable.
Consider the Videotape Privacy Protection Act ("VPPA"), 3' which
contains a requirement that a violation of the act's provisions must have
some effect on a plaintiff. The statute establishes that "[a]ny person
aggrieved by any act of a person in violation [of the act] may bring a
civil action" for damages.'32 In one of the few cases addressing the issue
of aggrievement under the VPPA, the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey in Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede'33 ruled
that, once a plaintiff shows a violation of the statute, "[n]o additional
proof of harm is required."' 3 4 Finding that the act had been violated
through the disclosure of the plaintiff's video rental information, the
court required no additional showing of injury to demonstrate
aggrievement under the act.'35 The Dirkes court relied upon the argument
espoused by Warren and Brandeis'3 6 that "a violation of an individual's
privacy constitutes a 'legal injuria.'""17 The court's construction of the
129. On the problem of appreciating intangible versus tangible harms, see generally, Spencer,
supra note 2.
130.

See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 153 (2000) (noting that the

concept of negligence and its constituent elements serve to "limitl] a defendant's liability both in
theory and in practice"); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 300-

01 (2d ed. 1985) (suggesting that, as a historical matter, tort law is concerned with limiting
liability).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
132. Id. § 2710(c)(1).
133. 936 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.J. 1996).
134. See id. at 239 n.4.
135. See id. at 239-40.
136. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
137. Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at 239 n.4 (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra note 103, at 213).
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VPPA's aggrievement thus reflected a tacit recognition that a privacy
injury is the actual harm of compromised control over information that
follows from the disclosure of video rental information, regardless of
whether the plaintiff had suffered a tangible loss of property or money,
or been compelled to take some action in response.
Though the Dirkes court construed the law correctly, its view of
aggrievement under the VPPA is vulnerable to the Smith court's
reasoning. New York's consumer protection law, which provides that
''any person who has been injured by reason of any violation of this
section may bring an action[,]', 3 8 has been construed as requiring that a
plaintiff demonstrate actual harm in order to recover. 3 9 The VPPA is
susceptible to a similar construction-in other contexts, courts have
understood aggrievement as requiring that a plaintiff demonstrate
injury.'4 ° Were a court to so construe the VPPA, it might also be inclined
to conclude-following Smith and in the absence of other persuasive
guidance-that a violation of the law is actionable only if, in response to
the disclosure of video rental information, an individual suffered a
tangible harm or was forced to take some action. Tnis construction of the
VPPA's aggrievement requirement would, of course, diminish the
impact of the VPPA and limit its efficacy in promoting the specific
privacy interest it seeks to protect.
The Smith analysis of privacy harm could also affect the
construction of laws like the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
("DPPA"), 4' which do not contain express provisions that could be
construed as requiring proof of harm. The DPPA allows individuals to
bring a civil action against anyone who "knowingly obtains, discloses or
uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record.' ' 4 ' The courts
have not held that the statute contains an implicit harm requirement; in
Cowan v. Codelia, P.C.," 4 1 for example, the court construed the act as
requiring the plaintiffs to establish only "(1) that the defendants caused a
DMV search to be made as to each plaintiff and (2) that the search was

138. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. § 349(h) (McKinney 1988).
139. See Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 741 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
140. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Three Seasons Ass'n No. 1,Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1445, 1447 (S.D.
Fla. 1998) (noting that an "aggrieved person" must suffer actual injury to state a claim under Fair
Housing Act). But see Warner v. Am. Cablevision of Kansas City, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 851, 858-59
(D. Kan. 1988) (ruling that aggrievement under Cable Communications Policy Act does not require
demonstration of actual injury).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (2000).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a).
143. No. 98 Civ. 5548(JGK), 2001 WL 856606 (S.D.N.Y. July 30,2001).
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not permitted by any exception to the DPPA.' 44 The failure to name a
harm requirement in Cowan and like cases may reflect little more than
an implicit presumption that an injury is synonymous with a statutory
violation-that is, synonymous with proof of the defendant's disclosure
of otherwise private information. But the possibility exists that, in the
absence of some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, a court
could construe the DPPA in a future case as confined to those privacy
injuries that, as defined by Smith, involve a tangible loss caused by the
disclosure, effectively limiting the statute's reach.
The privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
("GLBA")145 also do not contain a harm requirement. The act provides
that "a financial institution may not ... disclose to a nonaffiliated third

party any nonpublic personal information" 46 unless the consumer is
notified and given the opportunity to opt out of the institution's
disclosures. In Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Gavel, 47 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana concluded that
nonconsensual disclosure of personal information would result in
injury-but to the bank, and not necessarily to its customers.148 Though
the court noted the bank's contention that disclosure "would result in an
invasion of privacy of [its] customers[,] "'' 4 the court did not suggest that
as a result of such an invasion, customers would, without more, have an
actionable claim under the GLBA. Construction of the GLBA
accordingly remains open to the Smith court's analysis of the structure of
privacy injuries, which predicates a cause of action upon a showing that,
in response to the disclosure of personal information, individuals
suffered a tangible loss, or were compelled to take action or alter their
lives in some way.'50 As with the DPPA, adoption of this view likely
would reduce the scope of the GLBA's privacy protections.
V.

CONCLUSION

A failure to recognize as actionable the injuries suffered by the
plaintiffs in Smith v. Chase Manhattan risks undermining the value of
144. Id. at*8.
145. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (2000).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a).
147. No. CIV.A.02-1224, 2002 WL 975675 (E.D. La. May 9, 2002).
148. See id. at *6.
149. Id. at*2.
150. Indeed, the Gramm-Leech-Bliley Act ("GLBA") in particular may be more vulnerable to
a construction so limiting its privacy protections in light of post-September II security concerns
regarding financial institutions and information related to the financing of terrorism. See Spencer,
supra note 2, at 857-58.
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information privacy, both as a matter of law and as an individual
expectation. For if the law-as it is articulated and enforced by courts
construing statutory commands-fails to reflect the ways in which
individuals can experience the loss of information privacy as actual
harm, a probable effect will be dilution of the value itself. We might not
feel such dilution immediately, and we would probably adjust to it
eventually, but that does not mean that a diminishment of information
privacy is not without cost, at least to the extent we continue to prize the
values of autonomy and interpersonal development that information
privacy promotes. Absent recourse in law for privacy violations, conduct
affecting privacy remains in many respects unregulated, subject to the
control of institutional and commercial actors for whom the privacy of
individuals may be inconsequential or even problematic.'5
Thus, advocacy in future cases is critical.'52 Counsel for plaintiffs
pressing privacy claims must seek to persuade courts on both doctrinal
and normative grounds that dishonored privacy commitments are
actionable under consumer protection laws and, more broadly, that the
Smith court's understanding of the structure of privacy injuries was
erroneous. As illustrated by the examination of New York law in this
Article, established consumer protection doctrine provides a conceptual
means of appreciating a loss of information privacy as actual harm,
while the normative rationales for information privacy protection present
several justifications upon which a court could rely in concluding that
privacy injuries like that suffered by the Smith plaintiffs are indeed
actionable.'53 These normative rationales may also serve to inform the
understanding of privacy injuries outside of consumer transactions-

151. See Spencer, supra note 37, at 870 (discussing the incentive for businesses to favor
diminishment of privacy); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Identity, Privacy, and the New
Information Scalpers: Recalibrating the Rules of the Road in the Age of the Infobahn: A Response
to Fred C. Cate, 33 IND. L. REV. 233, 233-34 (1999) (noting that conduct like Amazon's "practice
of releasing employer-by-employer information about employees' purchases from the company"
and "the practice of telephone companies selling information about their customers to third parties,
[create] serious doubts about the wisdom of trusting privacy protection" to individual privacy
interests) (footnotes omitted).
152. As an initial matter, of course, counsel must make clear for a court the importance of
privacy as a value. There is no dearth of authority for this proposition. In Dirkes v. Borough of
Run,,emede, 936 F. Supp. 235, 238 (D.N.J. 1996), for example, the court observed that "our society
has firmly embraced the concept of privacy, as evidenced by Congressional statutes protecting this
right as it exists in various forms." But this authority must be made relevant-counsel must connect
the importance of the value of information privacy to the means by which it may be vindicated
through legal action, so that the consequences of a decision either to recognize a privacy claim or to
not recognize such a claim may be accurately gauged.
153. See supra Part III.
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such concerns as deterrence, the vindication of expressive values and
fairness are not necessarily limited to the consumer protection context.
Privacy proponents in recent years have suggested a variety of ways
in which information privacy can be protected or enhanced through
legislative action.' 4 Notwithstanding the importance of such efforts,
cases like Smith demonstrate that the usefulness of laws specifically
enacted to protect privacy, as well as those, like consumer protection
laws, which may afford situational protection to information privacy,
may depend upon a court's understanding of the structure of privacy
injuries. Privacy proponents accordingly should heed the importance of
impressing upon judges, as much as legislators and other governmental
actors, a sense of the consequences that may flow from a view of privacy
injuries that effectively undermines the ability of individuals to
challenge the loss of information privacy.

154. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 37, at 910-I1.
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